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Transnational Normative Orders:
The Constitutionalism of Intra- and
Trans-Normative Law
POUL F. KJAER*
ABSTRACT
No weakening, but rather an expansion, of statehood can be observed
in the contemporary world. This does not, on the other hand, imply that
extensive forms of constitutional ordering do not exist outside the realm
of states. Instead, the evolution of world society has been characterized by
a protracted dual movement where the expansion and densification of
statehood and autonomous forms of transnational ordering gradually
emerged in a mutually constitutive fashion. One implication of this is
that neither the concept of the state nor the concept of nonstate
transnational entities is adequately capable of delineating the object of
constitutional analysis. Instead, the concept of normative orders has been
introduced as an overarching category capable of identifying the contexts
within which constitutional ordering emerges.
Subsequently, a distinction between the internal and external
dimensions of the law of normative orders has been introduced,
specifying them as respectively oriented towards establishing internal
condensation of a given normative order and external compatibility
between different normative orders. With this background, a framework
for the analysis of constitutional frameworks of normative orders
developed. The central element is a distinction among three dimensions:
First, a constitution implies a coupling between a constitutional object,
in the form of a hierarchical organization of a given normative order
capable of reproducing an autonomous source of authority, and a
concordant legal framework. Second, constitutionalization implies a
coupling between an internal reconstruction of an external constitutional
subject within the constitutional object, and the register of legal rights,
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establishing a framework for exchanges between the constitutional object
and the wider world as represented by the constitutional subject. Third,
constitutionalism denotes the institutionalization of a double function, in
the form of a principle-based and legally fortified striving toward
universal inclusion, providing a sense of direction in time through an
articulated form of constitutional consciousness.
The insights developed are briefly illustrated by the case of the global
Fairtrade Certification System.
INTRODUCTION
The central function of nation-state law is to uphold normative
expectations.' In contrast, transnational law is primarily oriented
toward establishing frameworks of transfer and mutual adaptation. 2
This function is, however, not only unfolded within interstate
frameworks. Instead of transnational law, a broader category of law,
which deals with transfers and adaptations between normative orders
as such, has emerged. This type of law can also be understood as a
specific form of transnormative law insofar as it is characterized by a
relative structural supremacy of cognitive rather than normative
structures of expectations due to its primary orientation toward the
establishment of increased mutual adaptability among normative
orders.
Existing perspectives tend to understand the relationship between
the cognitive and normative dimensions of law on the basis of a
zero-sum perspective, where more of one implies less of the other. The
distinction between the cognitive and normative dimensions of law is,
however, logically conditioned by the continued relevance of both
dimensions. From a sociological perspective, the relation between the
cognitive and normative dimensions of law are moreover characterized
by a relationship of mutual increase where more of one implies more of
the other. Instead of experiencing marginalization, normative-based
legal communication has undergone a reconfiguration, which
increasingly transforms the normative dimension into a strategic rather
than tactical component. This, again, is the central reason for the
emergence of constitutional semantics beyond the state in recent
1. NIILAs LUHMANN, DAs RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM] 124
(Suhrkamp Verlag 1993) (Ger.) (discussing law as a social system).
2. See generally Marc Amstutz & Vaios Karavas, Weltrecht: Ein Derridasches Monster
[Global Law: Derridasches Monster], in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ: FESTSCHRIFT FOR
GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 645 [SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.
COMMEMORATIVE PUBLICATION FOR GONTHER TEUBNER'S 75TH BIRTHDAY] (Gralf-Peter
Callies et al. eds. 2009) (Ger.) (developing a specific theory of world law).
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decades, insofar as constitutional structures are the framework through
which a second-order normative stabilization of primarily
cognitive-oriented legal processes is achieved.
This development has advanced the most in relation to social
processes characterized by a primacy of functional differentiation and a
reduced reliance on stratificatory and territorial forms of differentiation
as internal forms of stabilization. In such settings, three-dimensional
frameworks have emerged that rely on the concepts of constitutions,
constitutionalization, and constitutionalism; and which serve as legal
forms of the self-reflection, prestation (Leistung), and
function-producing dimensions of social processes. Constitutions are
here understood as internal forms of ordering which are oriented toward
the establishment of a hierarchy of norms; constitutionalization as the
process through which exchanges and transfers between social entities
and their environments are legally stabilized; and constitutionalism as
a specific legal form through which the unity of past and future are
established. The transnational framework for fair-trade labeling
illustrates these insights.
I. THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED STATEHOOD
Most perspectives on constitutionalism in the global realm explicitly
or implicitly depart from the assumption that a weakening of statehood
can be observed and that this development is one of the primary courses
for the emergence of constitutionalism beyond the state. 3 This
perspective, in several ways, reflects a crude and simplified
understanding of statehood. From a purely numerical perspective, the
number of states has continued to expand rapidly throughout the last
two centuries, particularly throughout the last fifty years. Furthermore,
in terms of its reach, the phenomenon of statehood has gained a global
status only very recently, namely in the wake of the decolonization
processes of the mid-twentieth century. 4 Thus, when observed from a
long-term historical perspective, an unprecedented quantitative
expansion in statehood has taken place in recent history. But also,
3. See generally JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2009) (discussing and debating the
specialization and fragmentation that occurs in international law).
4. Rudolf Stichweh, Dimensionen des Weltstaats im System der Weltpolitik
[Dimensions of the World State within the System of World Politics], in WELTSTAAT UND
WELTSTAATLICHKEIT: BEOBACHTUNGEN GLOBALER POLITISCHER STRUKTURBILDUNG
[WORLD STATE AND WORLD STATEHOOD: OBSERVATIONS OF GLOBAL POLITICAL
STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT] 25 (Mathias Albert & Rudolf Stichweh eds. 2007) (Ger.)
(arguing that every political communication is embedded in a system of world politics and
discussing the question of whether this system constitutes a world state).
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statehood has continued expanding qualitatively. If one characterizes a
"strong state" as based on a formal and operational distinction between
the state and other segments of society, a fairly stable institutional
setup, and an extensive though not necessarily exclusive capability to
deploy political power in a generalized manner throughout its territory,
then it is possible to argue that a larger part of the planet is
characterized by strong statehood today than in any previous historical
period.5
But the expansion of statehood does not imply that the
state-centrist society, which scholars-such as Dieter Grimm6 and
Martin Loughlin 7-refer to, is alive and well. A sober historical
sociological perspective reveals that the state-centric society-where all
social operations within a given territory are succumbed to the
supremacy of the state while at the same time this state-based society
remains clearly demarcated from other societies-has in fact never
existed. The state, understood as a distinct political entity, has always
been faced with competition from extensive forms of ordering outside
the state. For example, as Chris Thornhill argued, the German state
was unable to deploy its power throughout its territory in an
unquestioned manner until sometime in the mid-twentieth century,
after the nobility-based forms of private ordering finally collapsed in the
wake of National Socialism and the Second World War.8 In a similar
manner, it might be argued, the U.S. federal government did not gain
unquestioned authority in the southern United States before sometime
in the mid-twentieth century, because until this point federal power was
continuously challenged by localistic counter movements. Furthermore,
in places such as southern Italy, southeastern Turkey, and the Basque
Country, similar counter movements continue to be vibrant today, just
as the strong presence of localistic power structures remains the norm
in most parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America thereby creating a
basis for legal pluralism.9 Thus, the vast majority of the world has not
5. See Poul F. Kjaer, The Concept of the Political in the Concept of Transnational
Constitutionalism: A Sociological Perspective, in AFTER GLOBALIZATION-NEW PATTERNS
or CONFLICT AND THEIR SOCIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION 285 (Christian
Jorges & Tommi Ralli eds., 2011), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1870003 (ast
visited Nov. 25, 2012).
6. See Dieter Grimm, The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a
Changed World, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 3, 3-4 (Petra Dobner & Martin
Loughlin eds., 2010).
7. See Von Martin Loughlin, In Defence of Staatslehre, 48 DER STAAT 1, 1 (2009).
8. See CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS AND
STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 339 (2011).
9. For the notion of legal pluralism, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal
Pluralism Past to Present, Local to Global, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. (2007).
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yet been subject to a successful Hegelian codification of society in its
entirety by the state. Instead, the state acts only as a thin veneer
covering up very persistent private and local forms of social ordering,
which operate beneath the state.
However, what is more important than this legal pluralist insight is
that modern statehood has always been linked to the reproduction of a
limited number of quite specific social functions. So even though a
larger part of the globe is gradually characterized by a modern type of
statehood, in which a limited, but generalized form of political power is
deployed throughout a territorial terrain, this does not mean that all
social operations within the territory in question automatically
succumbed to political power. Political power remains fundamentally
incapable of defining or controlling, for example, religious beliefs, the
beauty of art, the value of news, or scientific truths. Political supremacy
exists only in relation to the specific, albeit very fundamental, social
functions of political power, such as the legitimate exercise of physical
violence.o One consequence of this is, as Gunther Teubner observed,
that even the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century did not
manage to eradicate the existence of independent sources of social
meaning (Sinn) within realms, such as art, science, religion, and
economy, but the regimes merely suppressed these spheres of society
and forced them into an underground existence." Another consequence
of the structural limitation inherent to modern political power is that
the idea of "radical democracy" remains a fata morgana, because the
kind of democratic decision-making which has emerged in nation-states
is an institutional form intrinsically linked to the particularities of the
medium of political power.12
II. THE MULTIPLE LAYERS OF WORLD SOCIETY
When the diagnosis of statehood, as an expanding but nonetheless
limited form of political ordering, is linked to the issue of globalization,
it becomes evident that one cannot and should not see statehood and the
existence of extensive forms of transnational social ordering as related
to each other on the basis of a zero-sum game. On the contrary, the two
dimensions of world society are engaged in a relationship of mutual
increase. Whereas the globalization discourse is based on the
10. For an extensive analysis, see THORNHILL, supra note 8.
11. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 21-24 (2012).
12. Poul Kjaer, Law and Order Within and Beyond National Configurations, in THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPEcTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION 395 (Poul F. Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 2011).
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assumption of a radical increase in the importance and centrality of
transnational forms of social ordering,13 a historical perspective reveals
that national and transnational forms of ordering emerged hand in
hand. 14 The first modern public and private international organizations
appeared in the early nineteenth century at a time when only a handful
of modern states, covering an extremely limited part of the global
territory, existed. Thus, the radical expansion in the density of modern
forms of transnational ordering over the past two hundred years
unfolded hand in hand with the equally radical expansion in statehood.
In both cases, the most intensive expansions further took place in the
last fifty years, thereby underlining the mutually constitutiveness of the
two forms of ordering even further. Thus, no inherent contradiction
exists between statehood and transnational ordering. On the contrary,
the two phenomena have emerged in a double movement, which implied
a gradual globalization of statehood as well as a gradual replacement of
the colonialist form of transnationality, characterized by a strong
reliance on center/periphery differentiation, with the kind of
functionally differentiated regimes that make up the central form of
transnational ordering today.15 In short, national and transnational
forms of ordering have kept expanding their reach in a mutually
constitutive way, at the same time as the depth of their expansion
remains far more limited than typically assumed due to the continued
existence and vibrancy of localistic forms of social ordering, which
operate "beneath" state-based and transnational sites of ordering.
It follows that the system theoretical concept of world society, which
advances the idea that only one society exists and that this society
mainly is characterized by horizontal relations between function
systems such as politics, law, religion, economy and art, is inadequate
because it does not sufficiently acknowledge the independent value of
the vertical dimension of structure formation in world society as
reflected in the fundamentally different organizational principles and
logics characterizing local, national, and transnational forms of social
ordering in the global realm. A systematic two-dimensional perspective
taking both vertical and horizontal structures into account, however,
implies that transnational and national structures cannot be considered
functional equivalents possessing a quality that makes them mutually
substitutable.16 Rather than a globalization of already existing societal
regimes, which so far were embedded in national contexts,
13. See Kjaer, supra note 5, at 285.
14. Id.
15. See Mathias Albert & Barry Buzan, Securitization, Sectors and Functional
Differentiation, 42 SECURITY DIALOGUE 413, 423 (2011).
16. Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 2, at 652-53.
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transnational regimes constitute a different kind of regimes that fulfill
quite different societal functions. This is also reflected in their different
origins. The complex constitutional conglomerates, which in everyday
language are described as nation-states, grew gradually, through a
metamorphosis, out of the already existing feudal orders.17 Present day
transnational regimes, on the other hand, primarily emerged from
within the colonial form of transnational ordering,' 8 through the
reconfiguration of transnational processes of structure formation, away
from reliance on center/periphery differentiation, and toward an
increased reliance on functional differentiation as their central
organizational principle.
III. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LAW OF NORMATIVE ORDERS:
CONDENSATION AND TRANSFER
The term "transnational" is, however, problematic because it reflects
the state-centered bias of our conceptual apparatus. It is a purely
negatively defined term, which merely refers to a "nonstate" structure
with a spatial reach extending beyond state borders.1 9 In praxis the
term, therefore, implies that the concept of (nation) states is upheld as
the central object of analysis. This has led proponents of transnational
law to argue that society and not the state should be considered the
central source of law creation.20 Although true in principle, the concept
of society, however, remains too broad and underdetermined to serve as
the principle unit of analysis. Therefore, a more adequate object of
analysis is normative orders. Normative orders-such as tribes, clans,
states, organizations, regimes, and networks-are located within all
three layers of world society and share an ability to generate
independent sources of meaning (Sinn) through the reproduction of
external boundaries on the basis of inclusion/exclusion mechanisms.
Internally normative orders are furthermore characterized by a striving
toward establishing a coherent arrangement of rules, reflecting specific
structures of expectations (Erwartungsstrukturen),21 which are linked to
17. Kjaer, supra note 5, at 285.
18. See generally MARrrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (1989) (discussing
"the assumptions which control modern discourse about international law").
19. See generally PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
20. Peer Zumbansen, Law and Legal Pluralism: Hybridity in Transnational
Governance, in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE (Paulius
Jurys, Poul F. Kjaer & Ren Yurakami eds., 2013).
21. Robert N. Ross, Ellipsis and the Structure of Expectation, in 1 SAN JOSE
OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS (1975), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/
ED136558.pdf (requiring access to www.eric.ed.gov).
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the deployment of legal sanctions as a means of establishing compliance
with these expectations. Or differently put, the condition for a social
structure to become a normative order is that it gains a generalized
legal form.
Rather than the far too narrow categories of national and
transnational law (the latter sometimes described as international,
global, or world law), it is fruitful to introduce a distinction between the
internal and external dimensions of the law of normative orders. In the
still maturing discourse on transnational, global, and world law, these
forms of law are often considered to be functional equivalents to
nation-state law in the sense that the two forms of law are considered to
fulfill identical societal functions and thus to be mutually
substitutable. 22 The distinction between the internal and external law of
normative orders, however, provide a basis for a different view.23
Indeed, both dimensions of law refer to the same internal symbol of
validity (Geltungsymbol)-namely, the code law and nonlaw-which
serves as the central propeller of reflexivity through which the
self-preservation of law is ensured. In a similar vein, the prestation
(Leistung) that the internal and external dimensions of the law of
normative orders produce vis-A-vis other partial segments of world
society remains the same insofar as both dimensions are oriented
toward the handling of social conflicts occurring in other partial
segments of society. The fundamental, and very decisive, difference
between the internal and external law of normative orders can be found
in relation to their respective functions vis-A-vis world society in its
entirety. The primary function of the internal dimension is to ensure a
positive condensation, accomplished through reiteration 24 of the
normative order in question, through the establishment of a general
convergence of the time structures reproduced by that order
(Gesamtgesellschaftlicher Zeitausgleich).25 Somewhat relativizing the
Luhmannian world society thesis, this means that normative orders in
their internal setup can be understood as societies insofar as "the most
22. For a critique of this perspective, see Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 2, at 645.
23. For more on this point see: Poul F. Kjaer: Law of the Worlds-Towards an
Inter-Systemic Theory, in RECHT ZWISCHEN DOGMATIK UND THEORIE. MARC AMSTUTZ ZUM
50. GEBURTSTAG 159 [LAW INBETWEEN DOGMATISM AND THEORY. FOR MARC AMSTUTZ'S
50TH BIRTHDAY] (Stefan Keller & Stefan Wipraechtiger eds., 2012) (Ger.); Poul F. Kjaer,
The Political Foundations of Conflicts Law, 2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 227 (2011).
24. See Poul Kjaer, Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the
Habermas/Luhmann-Debate, Sept. 2006 ANCILLA IURIS 66, 70.
25. NIKLAs LuHmANN, DAs RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW OF THE COMMUNITY] 427
(Suhrkamp Verlag 1993) (Ger.).
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general function of a societal community is to articulate a system of
norms with a collective organization that has unity and cohesiveness." 26
The function of the external law of normative orders is the direct
opposite. Instead of condensation, its function is to facilitate the
transfer of compressed social components (Sinnkomponente), such as
economic products and capital, scientific knowledge, religious beliefs,
political decisions, and educational competences, between different
legally condensed normative orders. As is also apparent in Christian
Joerges's conflict laws approach within the context of European Union
law, 27 and Marc Amstutz's world law theory, using the private law
example of Corporate Social Responsibility, 28 the external law of
normative orders is essentially oriented toward establishing
compatibility between different legally condensed normative orders.
Expressed differently, although both the internal and the external
dimensions of the law of normative orders produce elements of positive
and negative integration, both forms are characterized by a
fundamental structural asymmetry insofar as the inner law of
normative orders has a built-in bias in favor of positive integration
through condensation and the external law a bias in favor of negative
integration through the facilitation of transfer.29
Not surprisingly, ideologically inclined participants in the ongoing
academic debate on the globalization of law and constitutional ordering
tend to analyze the implications of the distinction between internal and
external dimensions of normative orders as a difference between
republican and liberal perspectives. 30 Going beyond such indulgence in
semantics, which merely scratches on the surface of the social, the
fundamentally different functions of the internal and external
dimensions of the law of normative orders provide an explanation of the
mutual constitutiveness between national and transnational forms of
ordering in world society. Increased internal condensation of a
normative order implies the fortification of its boundaries through the
26. TALcOrT PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES 11 (1971).
27. See, e.g., Christian Joerges, Poul F. Kjaer & Tommi Ralli, A New Type of Conflicts
Law as Constitutional form in the Postnational Constellation, 2 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL
THEORY 153 (2011).
28. Amstutz & Karavas, supra note 2, at 657.
29. For an illustration of this in relation to "Social Europe," see Christian Joerges,
Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European
Integration Process, 9 COMP. SOC. 65 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy in the Multi-level European Polity, in THE
TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 89 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010)
("develop[ing] a theoretical framework which distinguishes between the sources for
legitimation in European politics .. . and the exercise of public authority.").
785
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
activation of exclusion mechanisms. 31 But far more decisive is that the
effective maintenance of boundaries always implies adaptation to the
environment in which such boundaries are made. A central insight of
systems theory is, therefore, that increased closure of a social entity is
the condition for increased openness and vice versa.32 Or differentially
expressed, increased condensation is conditioned by increased
possibility of transfer. For example, the conversion of early modern
England and the Netherlands into the first modern states was closely
linked to them being comparatively open economies, just as the gradual
strengthening of these states was structurally related to their
embeddedness in extensive forms of private law-based transnational
ordering through colonialism. 33 In the same manner, the most modern
states today, such as those located in North America and northwestern
Europe, remain the states with the most open economics and the
highest level of embeddedness in transnational frameworks, such as the
quasi-imperial alliance system of the United States and the European
Union. Furthermore-and rather counterintuitively-a strong
correlation seems to exist between the (economic) openness of a state
and the size of its public sector. The more open the economy is, the
larger the public sector tends to be, because increased openness implies
increased volatility, thereby creating a functional need for the
introduction of stabilizing mechanisms.34
IV. THE RECONFIGURATION OF COGNITIVE AND NORMATIVE STRUCTURES
OF EXPECTATIONS
The fundamentally different functions of the internal and external
law of normative orders, as expressed in their respective orientations
toward condensation and transfer, are also reflected in the structure of
expectations that the two forms of law rely on. As mentioned, systems
theory advances the insight that only one society-namely, world
society-exists. 35 Furthermore, the increasingly globalized structures of
31. NIKIAs LUHMANN, SOZIALE SYSTEME. GRUNDRIB EINER ALLGEMEINEN THEORIE
[SOCIAL SYSTEMS: LAYOUT OF A GENERAL THEORY] 593 (Suhrkamp, 1984) (Ger.).
32. Id.
33. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real
Spanish Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 1 (2011) (discussing development of private
rights from Spanish origins).
34. See generally Torben M. Andersen & Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson, Measuring
Globalization (Institute for Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper 817, 2003) (Ger.)
(using multifactor analysis to measure the openness of a country).
35. Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, in SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKIARUNG, BAND 2:
AUFsATZE ZUR THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAFT [SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT, VOLUME 2:
ESSAYS ON THEORY OF SOCIETY] 63 (2005) (1970) (Ger.).
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world society are characterized by an increased reliance on
cognitive-based structures of expectations, understood as expectations
subject to revision in case of disappointment, and by a diminished
reliance on normative-based structures of expectations, understood as
expectations upheld in spite of disappointment. 36 This dislocation is
seen as linked to a relative increase in the centrality of social processes
with a strong cognitive component, such as those related to science,
technology, and economy, and to a concordant relative decline in the
relevance of social processes with a strong normative component, such
as those related to politics, morality, religion, and law in the global
realm.37
This perspective, however, falls too short and goes too far at the
same time. It falls too short because, as also reflected in the emergence
of Managerialism38 at the transnational level, it is difficult to argue that
a relative decline in the relevance of political and legal forms of
communication can be observed. Rather, it is possible to observe a far
more profound transformation in the very nature of such previously
normative-based forms of communication. From the Open Method of
Coordination, to corporate social responsibility measures and
science-based risk regulation, it is possible to observe the emergence of
novel forms of political and legal regulation with a strong cognitive
component at the transnational level. This development is, of course,
not limited to the transnational sphere, but is rather a far more
profound development that also can be observed within the nation-state
level of world society.3 9 But due to the strong reliance on functional
differentiation at the transnational level of world society, rather than
the kind of territorial differentiation that remains a strong feature at
the nation-state level, inclusion/exclusion processes unfold in a far more
dynamic manner, which leads to systemic uncertainty concerning who is
included and who is excluded. Thus, a structural pressure for far more
flexible frameworks and, thereby, for a move toward an increased
reliance on cognitive-based frameworks can be observed within
transnational structures.
In spite of the deep-seated transformation of the core fabric of law
and politics through increased cognitivization, the system theoretical
perspective on the relationship between cognitive and normative
36. Id. at 68.
37. Id.
38. Marrti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New
Natural Law, 15 EUROPEAN J. OF INT'L RELATIONS 3, 395 (2009).
39. See Ino Augsberg, Observing (the) Law: The "Epistemological Turn" in Public Law
and the Evolution of Global Administrative Law, 11 in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN
THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE (Paulius Jurdys, Poul F. Kjaer & Ren Yatsunami eds., 2013).
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expectations is nonetheless problematic. That is the case because it
frames the relation as a zero-sum game. Not only is the existence of one
of the two dimensions logically conditioned by the existence of the
other,40 but the two sides of the distinction are mutually constitutive in
the sense that they are the product of coevolutionary developments,
where increased vibrancy of one dimension is conditioned by an
increased vibrancy of the other dimension. Rather than a reduction in
normative-based communication, a reconfiguration can be observed,
which implies an increased cognitivization at the operational
level-that is, at the level of tactics rather than strategy, at the level of
method rather than theory, and at the level of policy rather than
politics-while normative-based communication increasingly takes up a
strategic role. For instance, the social phenomenon of morality-one of
the prime examples of normatively based communication-has
undergone a massive transformation in the wake of increased functional
differentiation. It has pulled back and ceded its role as the initiator and
medium of the "community terror of village life" ("Gemeinschaftsterror
des dorflichen Zusammenlebens')41 and has become a far more reflexive
form of communication. In its most modern form, morality merely
fulfills an alarm function, reproduced along the boundaries of social
systems that are activated in two instances. 42 The first instance is
related to integrity preservation: When a social system sees itself as
being the victim of asymmetries, crowding-out effects and colonizing
tendencies emerging from its environment in the form of, for example,
doping, corruption, prostitution, or pollution, that threaten the
coherency of the system. In such cases, modern forms of moral
communication fulfill the function of raising awareness when societal
crisis emerge through processes of coalescence and boundary
dissolution. 43 The second instance is specific for function systems and is
expansionist in nature. Within function systems, in contrast to
organization and interaction systems, logics of "complete inclusion"
(Vollinklusion) through a coupling of all humans with specific social
roles (producing or audience roles) that correspond to the system in
40. See Moritz Renner, Death by Complexity-The Financial Crisis and the Crisis of
Law in World Society, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE
DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 12, at 93, 98.
41. NIKIAs LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE COMMUNITY OF
THE COMMUNITY] 813 (Suhrkamp 1997) (Ger.).
42. Id.
43. See generally Marc Amstutz, Eroding Boundaries: On Financial Crisis and an
Evolutionary Concept of Regulatory Reform, in THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 12, at 223
(discussing the dynamics in the dissolution of the financial system's boundaries as well as
impacts on other aspects of society).
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question can be observed.44 Missionary religions seek to convert all
humans worldwide into believers, the capitalist economy seeks to
transform all humans into producers and consumers, and the human
rights agenda is oriented toward a formal and factual inclusion of all
humans under the umbrella of human rights. But as long as such
striving remains contrafactual, rather than factual, through the
exclusion of a significant number of individuals, moral communication
tends to emerge.45 Moral communication in this instance fulfills the
function of pointing to an "untapped potential," which can be a source of
further expansion of the system in question.
In a similar fashion, the retreat of politics from hands-on control
over large segments of society in recent decades implies a
reconfiguration of the political, rather than a diminished impact of
political forms of communication. As the Foucaultians teach us, the
emergence of more refined, indirect, and thus, in their abstraction, less
visible ways of exercising power through new public management and
through other strongly cognitivized forms of policy-making reinforces
the scope for exercising power. It therefore remains impossible to claim
that strongly cognitivized regulatory processes, for example, within
areas as different as trade, health, food safety, or the Internet, are
becoming increasingly depoliticized, since they are all bound up on the
realization of internally defined normative and essentially political
visions concerning the establishment of nondiscriminatory free trade,
access to health, appropriate levels of food security, and access to
Internet-based communication on a worldwide basis.
It follows from the above that the constitutive distinction of
normative orders is the doubling of reality (Realitdtsverdopplung)
between facticity and normativity as expressed in the distinction
between the factual existing order and the internally reproduced, and
equally real, idea concerning how the order in question ought to look
like. As all social phenomena are process-based, this distinction is,
however, of a dynamic nature. Normative visions also change over time;
they only do so at a slower pace than the actually unfolding, and
increasingly cognitivized, social operations of a given order. A time gap
exists between the two dimensions and bridging this gap is the central
function of law in both its internal and external variants. The upholding
of normative expectations through condensation, dominant at the
nation-state level, as well as the increased possibility of transfer
through the initiation of cognitive-based learning processes, particularly
44. RUDOLF STICHWEH, INKLUSION UND EKLUSION. STUDIEN ZUR
GESELLSCHAFrSTHEORIE [INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION. STUDIES ON SOCIAL THEORY] 13
(Transcript, 2005) (Ger.).
45. Id.
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observable at the transnational level of world society, merely remain
two different strategies for fulfilling this function. As we will return to
in due course, establishing the unity between the two dimensions is,
furthermore, the central function of constitutionalism.
V. THE DOUBLE REFLEXIVITY OF INTERNAL CONSTITUTIONS
Constitutions are commonly understood as frames with a
quasi-transcendental character, as also expressed in the semantics of
body politics in early modernity.46 If constitutions fulfilled the function
of framing normative orders in their entirety, it would be possible to
maintain such a perspective. That is, however, not the case since the
constitutional object, throughout modern history, has been the formal
organizations of normative orders rather than the normative orders
themselves. This fundamental distinction has typically been
disregarded within constitutional scholarship. For example, those who
maintain that states are the only proper constitutional objects rely on
an under-complex understanding of statehood, in which the state is
equaled to a given normative order or society, in its entirety. As has
been clear since Hegel's introduction of the state/society distinction, a
state is, however, a specific form of formal organization among others,
or more correctly, a loosely coupled conglomerate of several
organizations, which exists only as long as it is formally and
operationally separated from the other segments of society.47 The
constitution of the state is, therefore, not the constitution of a normative
order in its entirety, but of a specific organizational conglomerate.
One implication that follows from the insight that the constitutional
object is not the state, but rather formal organizations, is that the range
of constitutional objects is far broader than typically assumed. This is
also underlined by the historical evolution of modern forms of formal
organization, since the basic organizational features of states were
originally developed within the framework of the Catholic Church and
only subsequently adopted by the emerging modern states.48 In a
similar manner, modern firms and other private organizations relied on
the modern state as the role model, from which they adopted their basic
46. ERNST H. KANTOROWICz, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957).
47. Niklas Luhmann, Die Unterscheidung von Staat und Gesellschaft, in
SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLARUNG, BAND 4: BEITRAGE ZUR FUNKTIONALEN DIFFERENZIERUNG
DER GESSELLSCHArr [SOCIOLOGIcAL ENLIGHTENMENT, VOLUME 4: ESSAYS ON THE
FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY ] 67 (1987) (Ger.).
48. Kantorowicz, supra note 46.
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features, 49 thereby opening up a conceptual horizon that makes it
possible to imagine quite a radical expansion in the sort of organizations
which can be observed through a constitutional lens.
A third implication is that the culturalist version of legal pluralism
misses a fundamental point when leaving out the organizational
perspective. Whereas the state centrist argument, concerning
constitutions being specific to modern states, falls too short, its insight
concerning the specific modern character of constitutions is
fundamentally true, as also expressed in the intrinsic link between
modern formal organizations and the emergence of constitutions. Thus,
whereas modern statehood and transnational forms of ordering are
coevolutionary phenomena-because they rely on the same form of
modern formal organization-they are both engaged in a zero-sum
relation vis-A-vis the kind of "pre-modern" and "culturalist" entities,
such as tribes, clans, and nobility networks operating "beneath" both
the state and transnational orders, which are gradually being
marginalized as a result of the conversion of society into a modern
"organizational society" (Organisationsgesellschaft).
In the wake of Hegel50 and Weber,51 a number of core features of
organizations can be pinned out:
First: Formalized exclusion and inclusion mechanisms on the basis
of membership enabling the establishment of boundaries between an
organization and its environment. Such membership is further divided
between primary (Leistungsrollen) and secondary roles
(Publikumsrollen).
Second: Formalized competences and procedures of decision-making
enabling a continued production of decisions, which apply to all
members, with one decision recursively emerging from earlier decisions.
Third: A reliance on dual organizational and legal hierarchies as the
form through which decisions are taken and transposed to the members.
Fourth: The existence of a formalized locus of authority that acts as
a vehicle for producing acceptance of the decisions produced.
49. See generally Poul F. Kjaer, Post-Hegelian Networks: Comments on the Chapter by
Simon Deakin, in NETWORKS: LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION 75 (Marc
Amstutz & Gunther Teubner eds., 2009) (using the metaphor of a guild to examine
emerging structures in "the so-called network society").
50. Georg W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Oder Naturrecht und
Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse [Base Lines of the Philosophy of Law. Or Natural Law
and Political Science in Outline], in WERKE IN 20 BANDEN MIT REGISTERBAND, BAND 7
[WORKS IN 20 VOLUMES WITH INDEX VOLUME, VOLUME 7] § 277 (Suhrkamp, 1986) (1821)
(Ger.).
51. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (H. H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1991) (1946).
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To the extent that all of these features are in place, it becomes
possible to speak of organizations as specific forms of autonomous
ordering in the sense that they become self-contained structures
producing decisions in a recursive manner, where one decision refers to
earlier decisions through reference to an internal source of authority. As
such, organizations first exist in a mature form when they become
self-reflexive in the sense that the production of decisions becomes an
internal process that unfolds over time.
A linkage to an external dimension, however, remains a condition
insofar as it is possible to speak of organizations as formal organizations
only if they are legally structured. Organizations only become formal
organizations through a linkage with a legal framework because
concordance with a coherent legal framework is the form through which
the four dimensions mentioned above are structurally linked and
coherency is established. As Teubner argued, formal organization
implies a specific form of double reflexivity in the sense that the
perspective of the organization in question and a legal perspective are
coupled together.52 Thus, the social process reproduced by a given
organization is simultaneously being mirrored in a concordant legal
perspective. Or differently expressed, organizational hierarchy is
mirrored in a correspondent hierarchy of legal norms.
The structural condition for the emergence of double reflexivity is,
however, as indicated under point three and four above, the internal
existence of hierarchy and autonomous sources of authority that can
serve as a basis for collectively binding decision-making. Thus, without
the existence of a political infrastructure within a given social structure,
there is no basis for a stable institutionalization of double reflexivity.
The Court of Arbitration for Sport can only engage in a mode of double
reflexivity as long as a political counterpart exists in the form of the
International Olympic Committee. Likewise, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Panel and Appellate Bodies can only establish
links possessing the quality of double reflexivity through a linkage to
the political dimension of the WTO in the form of the Ministerial
Conference, the General Council, and so forth. This form of double
reflexivity can, as done by Moritz Renner, be understood as a triangular
structural coupling between the legal and political systems and given
focal social process.58 This perspective implies a welcome break with
system theoretical orthodoxy, since systems theory in its present form
52. Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 'Hitting the Bottom, in
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 12, at 3, 25.
53. See Moritz Renner, Occupy the System! Societal Constitutionalism and
Transnational Corporate Accounting, 20 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 941 (2013).
792
TRANSNATIONAL NORMATWE ORDERS
can operate only with binary relations. A break with the binary
perspective not only implies a substantially different societal diagnosis
than the one presented by orthodox systems theory, but also implies
that one has to pursue a radical remodulation of the theory in its
entirety. An alternative to the triangular perspective emerges through
the distinction between primary and secondary forms of the political
system.54 The distinction is between, on the one hand, couplings of law
and processes that are primarily political, such as those unfolding
within states and public transnational bodies such as the European
Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization, and, on
the other hand, couplings between the legal system and private social
processes where political decision-making structures have emerged
internally.5 The latter form can be observed within private entities,
such as trade associations, private regulatory bodies, and NGOs, and
can be described as a form of "secondary politics." Secondary politics
describe such structures primarily because they consider themselves
related to the substantial function they exercise-for example, economy,
sports, health, or religion-at the same time as their striving toward a
stabilization of such processes gives them an additional political
dimension.
In sum, constitutions can be understood as institutions which, in
their political function, frame the body of rules and norms that establish
the formal structure, decisional competences, and a hierarchically based
locus of authority within an organizational structure; at the same time,
they, in their legal function, lay down principles for the structuring of
conflicts between norms within such an entity. Constitutions are in this
sense laying down the enabling and the limitative rules guiding formal
organizations. Thus, it is, in principle, possible to claim that
constitutions exist in all cases where both a legal and a nonlegal social
structure are bound together within the framework of a formal
organization, thereby establishing a particular form of double
self-constitution that ensures concordance between a legal and nonlegal
perspective. Not just states, but in principle all formal organizations,
including those operating in the transnational sphere, can be the object
of a constitution.56
54. See TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 114.
55. For more on this point see Kjaer, supra note 12, at 395, 425.
56. See Hauke Brunkhorst, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the World Society, in
THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra note 6, at 179, 197.
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VI. THE DOUBLE PRESTATION OF EXTERNAL CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
In the above section, constitutions are treated as an internal feature
of formal organizations, in the sense that a linkage with law enables a
condensation of authority through the establishment of legal and
organizational hierarchy. But like all other types of social systems,
organizations only come into existence through a demarcation and
maintenance of boundaries to their respective social environments.57
The establishment of coherency through the development of a consistent
set of internal norms is conditioned by the maintenance of such
boundaries. At the same time organizations, like all other types of social
systems, intersect with other social structures in their social
environment. Besides handling the functional need of internal
preservation of coherency, as outlined in the previous section, the
establishment of external connectability is the most central function of
constitutions. Constitutions, in their external dimension, delineate the
segment of their social environments that organizations, or
conglomerates of organizations, take account of. Constitutions establish
"internal environments" in the sense that they internally construct an
abstract medium that fulfills a dual role: First, the transposition of
compressed social components, such as political decisions, economic
capital and products, scientific knowledge, and religious promises of
salvation that a given organization produces into the wider society.
Second, the channeling and incorporation of compressed social
components produced elsewhere in society into a given organization.
The praxis of fulfilling this dual function is what is being described with
the term constitutionalization,5 8 insofar as this term denotes the process
of stabilizing the exchanges between a given formal organization and
the rest of society. Thus, returning to classical constitutional
vocabulary, constitutionalization can also be understood as the internal
process through which a formal organization delineates a constitutional
subject. 59 A subject that not only provides a mirror image of the
organization's social environment, but also serves as the medium for the
transposition of compressed social components to and from the social
environment of a given organization.
57. NIKLAs LUHMANN, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT [THE COMMUNITY OF
THE COMMUNITY] 826 (Suhrkamp 1997) (Ger.).
58. See Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalisation?, in THE TWILIGHT OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM?, supra note 6, at 47, 60.
59. For this perspective, see also Christopher Thornhill, A Sociology of Constituent
Power: The Political Code of Transnational Societal Constitutions, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 551 (2013).
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The classical example of such an internal environment is the legally
constructed "nation" or "people" emerging within the political system in
the state form. The construction of a nation-understood as an abstract
and generalized form, as opposed to the sum of individuals within a
given territory-is made to delineate the segment of its social
environment of which a given political system observes and takes
account in its decision-making. For example, the United States
Congress is only obliged to account of the effects that its
decision-making has on the American nation, but not the effects on the
Canadian or the Mexican nations. More concretely, the concept of the
nation serves as a medium through which decisions are transposed into
the wider society. On the other hand, the nation is also a form through
which perspectives emerging from the environment are transferred into
the political system. In order for this to happen, an operationalization of
the nation, through the construction of social roles and specific
structures of expectation, is necessary. This takes two different forms:
First, an operationalization occurs through a stabilization and
formalization of relations to other organizational structures since
relations are formalized through institutionalized negotiation systems
(Verhandlungssysteme) in the form of advisory councils, networks,
commissions, and other platforms of transfer that are established
between the political system and various organizations (e.g. economic,
scientific, and religious organizations). Second, operationalization
occurs through the establishment of primary and secondary roles by
introducing a distinction between those who govern and those who are
being governed (Regierende und Regierte)6 0-that is, those who are
internally located in the political system and those who are located in
the internal environment. In democratic states, a further distinction
between the citizens and the voter is further introduced within the
environment. The former is serving a passive role as "audience" and the
latter an active role in the sense that, through voting, the actual
transfer from the environment to the political system takes place.
At the transnational level of world society, the turn to
network-based governance fulfills a similar role for organizations
operating within functionally delineated normative orders. In the case
of the EU, governance structures such as Comitology and the Open
Method of Coordination and (Regulatory) Agencies fulfill the role as
heterarchcial frameworks through which transfer of compressed social
components between the EU legal order and its environment (including
60. Niklas Luhmann, Die Zukunft der Demokratie, in SOZIOLOGISCHE AUFKLARUNG,
BAND 4: BEITRAGE ZUR FUNKTIONALEN DIFFERENZIERUNG DER GESSELLSCHAFT
[SOCIOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT, VOLUME 4: ESSAYS ON THE FUNCTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION OF SOICETY ] supra note 47, at 126.
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the legal orders of the Member States) are framed.61 Comparable,
though far more embryonic, structures have also emerged around global
public and private organizations such as large-scale NGOs,
multinational companies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank, and the World Health Organization (WHO). These
organizations share the feature that they are faced with the challenge of
delineating their respective environments but cannot turn to the
concept of a nation, as they are not internally stabilized through a
reference to territorial demarcations, thereby triggering the emergence
of the concept of "stakeholders" as a functional equivalent to the concept
of the nation. The stakeholder form is characterized by a far stronger
cognitive component when compared with the form of the nation, insofar
as it possesses a strong element of exchangeability on the basis of a
criterion of functionality.62 Although nations rarely have been the stable
units that nationalist theory and most normative political and legal
theories assume them to be, the logics of inclusion and exclusion
nevertheless have a far stronger temporal character within stakeholder
settings. 63
The increased level of temporality, and thus contingency, is the
likely explanation of the strong reliance on rights within transnational
settings. Rights are the legal form which constitutionalization takes.
Whereas Thornhill seems to reduce rights to the only form through
which inclusion/exclusion processes are handled, 64 the structural
capability of both national and transnational formal organizations to
develop rights regimes seems to be conditioned by their attachment to
generalized nonlegal mediums that represent a distilled version of
existing sociocultural material, as expressed in the nation and
stakeholder phenomena. Even though rights regimes tend to emerge
from within the social processes they are attached to-rather than being
externally imposed-they become identifiable and operational only
when a distinction between the legal and the nonlegal dimensions is
established, leading to the emergence of a specific form of double
prestation. Traditionally, the register of rights is understood as the
framework through which, in the same operation, liberties are secured
and obligations imposed on legal subjects.6 5 The central societal
61. POUL F. KJAER, BETWEEN GOVERNING AND GOVERNANCE: ON THE EMERGENCE,
FUNCTION AND FORM OF EUROPE'S POST-NATIONAL CONSTELLATION 37 (2010).
62. See Poul F. Kjaer, The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental
European Perspective on Governance, Law and the Political in the Transnational Space, 57
WIs. L. REV. 489 (2010).
63. Id.
64. Thornhill, supra note 59.
65. Id.
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prestation (Leistung) of rights is, however, to provide compressed social
components with a legal form, which enable their transfer in a manner
that does not destabilize the operational integrity of the donating as
well as the receiving entity.66
It follows that constitutionalization does not only imply an increase
in the self-reflexivity of a given formal organization.
Constitutionalization is not just an exercise in negative self-binding that
organizations pursue to reduce the risk of self-destruction through
systemic overstretch.6 7 This view, which can be traced back to
Luhmann's strategic, but essentially contingent, choice to emphasize
the self-reflexivity of social systems while systematically playing down
the prestation and function dimensions of social systems, leads to an
empirically implausible description of society.68  Rather,
constitutionalization processes provide a far more positive contribution
toward other segments of society insofar as they are aimed at reducing
negative externalities, colonizing tendencies, and crowding out effects
vis-A-vis the respective environments of constitutional orders. This is
also confirmed by the contextual settings within which constitutions
emerge. Constitutions never stand alone, but always emerge in
coevolutionary settings where several orders emerge simultaneously.
Nation-states, for example, are not unitary structures but rather take
the form of constitutional conglomerates where state constitutions,
church constitutions, and labor constitutions come together. This again
makes the multiple intersections between constitutions into battlefields
where constitutional orders are delineated and where justifying
narratives emerge concerning the prestation that specific constitutional
orders produce vis-A-vis other segments of society. The emergence of
constitutions is structurally conditioned by constitutionalization
processes capable of guaranteeing that mutually reinforcing
coevolutionary processes unfold. The emergence of an autonomous
constitutional order within the European Union is a perfect example of
this, insofar as the internal establishment of legal and organizational
hierarchy was conditioned on the coevolutionary emergence of
heterarchical legal and organizational frameworks, in the form of the
governance structures, such as Agencies, Comitology, and the Open
Method of Coordination, which ensured concordance between the EU
constitutional order and its environment, most notably the Member
State legal orders.
66. Id.
67. See Teubner, supra note 52, at 21.
68. Luhmann maintains formal equality between the three dimensions at the same
time as his empirical descriptions of social processes tend to have a one-sided focus on the
reflexivity dimension. For the formal layout, see LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 610.
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VII. THE DOUBLE FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM BETWEEN PAST AND
FUTURE
The distinction between internal ordering and external heterarchy,
as expressed in the distinction between constitutions and
constitutionalization, constitutes a paradoxical tension. This tension can
also be described utilizing the distinction between hierarchically
organized and spontaneous heterarchical processes.69 A normative order
first exists when a unity of these two dimensions is established, and
establishing this unity necessitates recourse in time. In the same
manner, as normative constitutional theory seeks to dissolve the tension
between republican politics and liberal rights through societal learning
processes unfolded over time,70 it is also possible to observe from a
sociological perspective that constitutional setups do not just mirror
existing structures, but rather, express a specific vision of the future on
the basis of a specific understanding of the past.7 ' Such visions can also
be described as representing a form of "constitutional consciousness"
capable of providing a basis for a counterfactual claim concerning a
possible constitutional framing of a normative order in its entirety. It is
the establishment of such constitutional consciousness that is described
with the term constitutionalism.
As indicated earlier, law operates with counterfactual propositions,
which are oriented toward the future. Constitutionalism, however,
implies orientation toward a specific kind of counterfactual proposition
that can be described with the term double function. Constitutionalism
implies that from a focal perspective-including economic, political, or
environmental-as well as from a legal perspective, a vision of
"complete inclusion" is developed, which implies that, in principle, all
humans can be subject to inclusion into the normative order in question.
Originally developed within the Church of Rome, the counterfactual
striving for complete inclusion-in this case through the transformation
of all individuals into members of the Catholic Church and the
subordination of all worldly powers into subordinates of Rome-has
become generalized. For example, the French Republic, the historical
role model for most continental states, has traditionally relied on a
self-understanding that is closely linked to the counterfactual idea
concerning a realization of the ideals of the French revolution
throughout the world. Similar developments can be observed within
sectorial regimes consisting of constitutional organizations and their
69. See TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 89-90.
70. See Jilrgen Habermas & William Rehg, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical
Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 774 (William Rehg trans., 2001).
71. Id.
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surrounding constitutionalized networks, such as the WTO regime, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
regime, the WHO regime, and the still emerging global human rights
regime.7 2 Counterfactual objectives are universal in nature, such as the
striving toward the realization of nondiscriminatory free trade, free and
uncensored global access to the Internet, basic worldwide access to
health, and not only a formal, but also a de facto inclusion of all humans
under the umbrella of the human rights regime. In other words,
constitutionalism implies the institutionalization of normative
teleology's and a hierarchical relationship between teleology's and
increasingly cognitivized processes of juridification. Once such logics are
in place, it is possible to talk about constitutionalism in a deep and
mature sense. Constitutional ordering is, therefore, not only about
facilitative and limitative rules, but also reflects a move toward
self-transcendence through the unfolding of a universalistic aspiration.
VIII. THE EXAMPLE OF THE FAIRTRADE CERTIFICATION SYSTEM
From the theoretical framework outlined above, three core
dimensions of a mature constitutionalist order can be deduced:
A constitutional order characterized by double reflexivity through a
coupling between a constitutional object, in the form of a hierarchical
organization that can produce an autonomous source of authority, and a
concordant legal framework.
Constitutionalization through double prestation, implying a
coupling between, on the one hand, an internal reconstruction of an
external constitutional subject within the constitutional object, and, on
the other hand, a register of legal rights, establishing a framework for
exchanges between the constitutional object and the wider world, as
represented by the constitutional subject.
Constitutionalism, through the institutionalization of a double
function, in the form of a principle-based and legally fortified striving
toward universal inclusion, providing a sense of direction in time
through an articulated form of constitutional consciousness.
The real world existence of such frameworks can be briefly
illustrated through the example of the Fairtrade Certification System.
The scheme is organized and overseen by a private international
organization, the Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International
(FLO).73 FLO was founded in 1997 as an international umbrella
72. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. OF INT'L. L. 999 (2004).
73. See What We Do, FAIRTRADE INT'L, http://www.fairtrade.net/whatwe-do.html (last
visited Nov. 25, 2012).
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organization for national fair trade labeling organizations. Its core task
is to develop internationally coordinated standards for fair trade and to
assist producers in gaining and maintaining certification of fair trade.
The central focus is on agricultural products, such as bananas and
coffee, but FLO's reach has also been expanded into areas such as
textiles. The products are, however, part of global production,
distribution, and consumption chains that typically imply transfers
between developing and developed parts of the global economy. 74
The orientation is twofold, as the standards are aimed at ensuring
ecological sustainability and establishing social and labor standards in
the production process. A key strategy of FLO is to establish
transparent and long-term trade relations among producers, importers,
processers, and distributors through long-term contracts that set
minimum prices, thereby reducing the exposure of the producers to
market volatility and pressure from large-scale companies.7 5 In
addition, a "social premium" is paid, serving as a kind of de facto tax
that is allocated to the promotion of common goods relevant to the
producers and is typically invested in local development, such as
education and health facilities for the producers. The producers who
own the production sites-typically agricultural land-are organized in
cooperatives. Alternatively, work councils are established that represent
employees vis-A-vis landowners.76
In 2004, the organization was split into two subunits: FLO
International and FLO-CERT. Both are based in Bonn, Germany. FLO
is a not-for-profit organization ("eingetragener Verein") and operates in
concordance with the German public benefit law. FLO-CERT is
structured as a limited-liability company (Gmbh) under German law.7 7
FLO International maintained the core task of developing fair trade
standards while FLO-CERT ensures that producers and traders comply
74. For an overview of the framework see especially ALEX NICHOLLS & CHARLOTTE
OPAL, FAIR TRADE: MARKET-DRIVEN ETHICAL CONSUMPTION (2005). See also DANIEL
JAFFEE, BREWING JUSTICE: FAIR TRADE COFFEE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND SURVIVAL (2007)
(examining if fair trade is working by looking at coffee farmers in Mexico); Valentin Beck,
Theorizing Fairtrade From a Justice-Related Standpoint, 3 GLOBAL JUSTICE: THEORY,
PRACTICE, RHETORIC 1 (2010) (examining fair trade in two step process, first looking at
interactions of participants and then looking at responsibilities of participants); Loraine
Ronchi, The Impact of Fair Trade on Producers and Their Organisations: A Case Study
with Coocafg in Costa Rica (Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, Prus Working Paper No. 11,
2002), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/PRU/wps/wp11.pdf.
75. What we do, supra note 73.
76. Id.
77. Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, Constitution of the Association, §§
1.1-1.2 (amended June 10, 2011), available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user-
upload/content/2009/about-us/documents/flo-constitution-june-2011-english.pdf.
800
TRANSNATIONAL NORMATIVE ORDERS
with the standards of FLO International.7 8 FLO-CERT has the
competence to impose sanctions in case of noncompliance. The ultimate
sanction is decertification and exclusion from the system.
FLO has developed a foundational text that it calls a constitution.79
The constitutional text is an eleven-page document with a preamble and
eighteen paragraphs that set out the basic framework on which the
organization operates, including a specification of its central organs and
the purpose of its activities. The constitutions can be amended only
through a majority of 75 percent of the organization's members.8 0 The
constitution establishes the General Assembly as the central
institutional organ.81 It is comprised of 50 percent producer
representatives and 50 percent representatives from the national
labeling organizations. 82 The two groups are further organized in two
different subassemblies. The General Assembly has the characteristics
of a "parliament" insofar as its core function is representation, the
development of legislative-like rules, and general oversight. 83 As such,
the assembly serves as the ultimate locus of authority for the
organization while remaining coupled to law through the constitution,
the internal procedural framework, and through the reliance on German
law.
The General Assembly elects the board that consists of five
representatives from labeling organizations; four representatives from
producer organizations (representing different geographical regions);
two representatives from certified traders; and three external
independent experts.84 Both in relation to the assembly and the board, a
key characteristic is the deliberate design of a multiple-stakeholder
framework. The organization is, in this sense, mimicking a
balance-of-interest approach as known from classical state-based
constitutional set-ups. At the same time, the "external experts" are
granted a privileged position as they hold the key to establishing a
majority. The mediation between different stakeholder groups is
assigned to representatives who are expected to represent a neutral and
knowledge-based, and thus "cognitivized," position. A similar framework
exists in relation to the various subcommittees, most notably the
standard setting committee.
78. Certifying Fairtrade, FAiRTRADE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.fairtrade.net/
certifying-fairtrade.html?&L-0 (last visited June 12, 2013).
79. Id.
80. Id. at § 3.1.
81. Id. at § 7.
82. Id. at § 9, 10.
83. Id. at § 7.1.
84. Id. at § 12.
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The multiple-stakeholder framework also serves as an internal
mirror reflecting the organization's external environment. By defining
specific categories of producers, importers, processers, and distributors
in its constitution,8 FLO delineates the segment of world society that
can be potentially included in the framework, and thereby the
boundaries of the normative order it seeks to establish. This delineation
is then combined with specific procedures for actual inclusion through
membership application and certification, thereby creating a dual
framework based on a distinction between potentiality and actuality.
Actual inclusion is, furthermore, linked to a dense framework of rights,
imposing a dual framework of obligations and standing, most notably
through adherence to standards and through access to review and
decision-making processes. At the same time, the rights framework
serves as the central infrastructure, which enables the production of a
specific prestation vis-A-vis other segments of world society, insofar as it
is oriented toward the facilitation of transfer of products and capital
between the producers, importers, processers, and distributors. Thus, a
move toward constitutionalization can be observed as FLO defines a
constitutional subject via its multiple-stakeholder framework and
subsequently seeks to minimize the distinction between potential and
actual inclusion. The implementation of the rights dimension is
outsourced to FLO-CERT, which certifies compliance through
inspections and imposes sanctions in case of noncompliance, such as
demands for corrective measures and, ultimately, expulsion. Thus,
FLO-CERT serves as an independent "judiciary" that combines an
investigative function with the objective of applying the norms produced
by FLO.
Finally, FLO has condensed its activities in a mission-namely, "to
connect disadvantaged producers and consumers, promote fairer trading
conditions and empower producers to combat poverty, strengthen their
position and take more control over their lives."8 6 This mission is
deduced from a vision. The vision of FLO "is a world in which all
producers can enjoy secure and sustainable livelihoods, fulfill their
potential and decide on their future."8 7 The organization remains
strategically guided by a normative, and thus counterfactual, objective
concerning full inclusion for the segment of world society, which it
orients itself against, thereby externalizing the tension between
potential and actual members in the future. Thus, FLO can be
understood as a fully-fledged normative order, which internally
85. Id.
86. Our Vision, FAIRTRADE INT'L, http://www.fairtrade.net/our-vision.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2012).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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produces coherency between its different dimensions, as represented by
producers, importers, processers, and distributors. And so, FLO
externally demarcates itself through the double delineation of potential
and actual members, as well as through the establishment of a
constitutional structure characterized by a dual political and legal
hierarchy and a normative vision that grants it an articulated form of
constitutional consciousness that points to the future.

